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Abstract
Maritime boundary issues are by no mean new for Indonesia and Malaysia. Notwithstanding the 
fact that Indonesia and Malaysia signed a maritime boundary agreement as early as 1969, the two 
States have yet to finalise various pending maritime boundaries between them. Compelling cases 
such as Ambalat Block dispute (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) another incidence in 
the Malacca Strait (April 2011) and others maritime boundary issues are apparently consequences 
of unfinished maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia. This paper seeks to analyse 
challenges and opportunities in finalising maritime boundaries in the Malacca Strait between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. It focuses on description of maritime boundaries between the two States, 
followed by recent developments in the Malacca Strait. An incident involving Indonesian patrolling 
officers and Malaysian-flagged fishing vessels which occurred on 7 April 2011 is the key case 
discussed. It is viewed as a relevant representation of what happen between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
which also applies to other areas where maritime boundaries are pending or absent. This discussion 
eventually highlights the importance of maritime boundary delimitation in the Malacca Strait between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Options for maritime delimitation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the 
Malacca Strait are the main outcomes of this paper. This is achieved by taking into consideration 
principle of the law of the sea, relevant jurisprudence, and existing agreement between Indonesia 
and Malaysia. To accurately generate options for delimitation, geospatial approach was employed by 
utilising relevant geospatial data and technical tools and operations.
Keywords: maritime boundary delimitation, Malacca Strait, law of the sea, 
geospatial
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its geographic location Indonesia shares maritime areas with 
at least ten States: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Phil-
ippines, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Australia and Timor Leste.1 Indo-
nesia needs to settle maritime boundaries with these ten States and has 
* Author is a lecturer in Geodesy and Geomatics,Gadjah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He can be reached at madeandi@ugm.ac.id
1 Oegroseno, A.H. 2009. “Indonesia’s maritime boundaries”, in: Robert Cribb and 
Michele Ford (eds), Indonesia beyond the water’s edge; Managing an archipelagic 
state, pp. 49-58. Singapore: ISEAS.
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managed to establish some boundary segments with eight of them. Two 
States for which no maritime boundaries have been settled with Indo-
nesia to date are Palau and Timor Leste. As per March 2015, Indonesia 
has yet to finalise maritime boundaries in at least 10 different locations 
with more than 15 segments to accomplish.2 
Pending maritime boundaries have been proven to be one of the 
sources of problems between Indonesia and its neighbours. Among 
those ten neighbours, issues with Malaysia seem to be most frequent. 
Compelling cases such as the Ambalat Block dispute (2005, 2009),3 Tan-
jung Berakit incident (2010)4 an incidence in the Malacca Strait (April 
2011)5 and recent issue related to the construction if a light  in Tanjung 
Datu6 are apparently consequences of pending maritime boundaries 
between the two States. Accordingly, finalising maritime delimitation 
should be prioritised.
A classic boundary making theory prescribes that there are four es-
sential steps in boundary making: allocation, delimitation, demarcation 
and administration.7 Allocation deals with political activities to define 
allocation of territory where parties concerned agree on a broad divi-
2  The calculation was conducted by the author after taking into account the two last 
agreements between Indonesia and the Philippines (23 May 2014) and between 
Indonesia and Singapore (3 September 2014).
3  For an analysis on Block Ambalat dispute, see for example: Arsana, I.M.A. 2010. 
“The settlement of the Ambalat block case through maritime delimitation; A geo-
spatial and legal approach [in Indonesian]”, Jurnal Ilmiah Widya Sosiopolitika Vol. 
I No. 1 (June): pp. 46-58.
4  For an analysis on Tanjung Berakit incident and option of maritime delimitation in 
the area, see: Arsana, I.M.A. 2011. “Mending the imaginary wall between Indonesia 
and Malaysia - The case of maritime delimitation in the waters off Tanjung Berakit”, 
Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011)
5  Arsana, I.M.A. 2011. “Understanding the Malacca Strait Incident”, The Jakarta 
Post, 14 April, Jakarta.
6  Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014, Indonesian Foreign Minister reports on the 
development of ASEAN and achievement of Indonesian diplomacy in the Region.
[Di Komisi I, Menlu RI Sampaikan Perkembangan ASEAN dan Capaian Diplomasi 
RI di Kawasan], available at <http://www.kemlu.go.id/_layouts/mobile/PortalDetail-
NewsLike.aspx?l=id&ItemID=171e0b11-0ca4-4919-8bea-f9f6e7f0c5fd>
7  Jones, S. B. 1945. Boundary-making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and 
Boundary Commissioners. Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace.
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sion of territory, thus establishing ‘spheres of influence’. Delimitation is 
the next step, where parties involve political, legal and technical experts 
to decide on a precise alignment of the boundary and illustrate the line 
on maps/charts. At this stage, a treaty is drawn up. After delimitation 
on maps/charts, demarcation is required on the ground. The points and 
lines agreed in the delimitation stage are transferred from the maps/
charts to the ground where it is physically marked with pillars, posts, 
fences, etc. Demarcation is conducted to define coordinates through 
survey activities using adequate technology, equipment and method. 
For the field survey, the role of geodetic surveyors is essential. The 
use of sophisticated technology and scientific approach is a must to 
achieve accurate position of the border points.8 At this stage, collabora-
tion between the two neighbouring States during the establishment of 
border points is inevitable. The word ‘demarcation’ is however rarely 
applicable to maritime boundaries because maritime boundaries are 
rarely amenable to being physically marked. The last step is adminis-
tration and management of boundaries involving activities to maintain 
the points and lines that form the boundaries by the neighbouring states. 
Not only that, administration relates to the management of people’s ac-
tivities around boundary area. In the case of maritime boundaries, the 
administration step mainly deals with navigational activities such as 
transportation and fishing around border areas.
In the case of Malacca Strait, Indonesia and Malaysia are dealing 
with delimitation step in boundary making, especially for the water col-
umn. Seabed boundary was agreed upon in 1969 and the water column 
boundary is currently under negotiation.9 This suggests that entitlement 
of seabed and resources therein has been made clear but not that of 
water column. Consequently, rights of States (Indonesia and Malaysia) 
8  Arsana, I.M.A. and Sumaryo 2010. “Geospatial Aspects of Indonesian International 
Maritime Boundaries  in the Context of Border Management [Aspek Geospasial 
Batas Maritim Internasional Indonesia dalam Pengelolaan Wilayah Perbatasan]”. 
Managing Indonesian Boundaries in a Borderless World: Issues, Problems, 
and Policy Options [Mengelola perbatasan Indonesia di dunia tanpa batas: isu, 
permasalahan, dan pilihan kebijakan] L. Madu, A. Nugraha, N. Loy and Fauzan. 
Yogyakarta, Graha Ilmu.
9  The 27th technical meeting between Indonesia and Malaysia with regards to maritime 
boundary delimitation was conducted on 26-28 February 2015 in Jakarta. See: http://
pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/content.php?content=file_detailinfo&id=94
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on the utilisation of oil and gas have been clarified but not that of fish.10 
Even though maritime delimitation has yet to be finalised in the 
Malacca Strait, each State has laid their EEZ claim. As a result, each 
has issued maps showing their respective unilateral claims. Unsurpris-
ingly, the lines that the States have claimed do not coincide with each 
others claims and also overlap in some instances. Indonesia believes 
that the overlapping maritime area falls within Indonesia’s jurisdiction 
and so does Malaysia. Interestingly, both States conduct law enforce-
ment in the area based on their respective unilateral claims. Activities 
conducted by Malaysian fishermen in the area will be viewed as an in-
fringement by Indonesia and vice versa. Agreed and pending maritime 
boundaries in the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia are 
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Agreed and pending maritime boundaries in the Malacca Strait
10  To understand different regimes of maritime zone of jurisdictions, see: United Na-
tion Convention on the Law of the Sea, particularly Part V (EEZ) and Part VI (Con-
tinental Shelf).
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II. MARITIME CLAIMS AND BOUNDARIES
Before stepping into the Singapore Strait case, it is worth recalling 
the principle of maritime claims and boundary delimitation. These fol-
lowing subsections describe how a coastal State can claim maritime 
area, and where maritime delimitation is required.
A. Maritime Claims 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (herein-
after is referred to as Law of the Sea Convention, LOSC) is the latest and 
most comprehensive convention on the law of the sea.11 The Conven-
tion has been ratified by 161 States plus one European Union.12 LOSC 
established a number of maritime zones, each of which assigns different 
exclusive rights and control to coastal States. The zones are territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental 
shelf. Each maritime zone is measured seaward form baseline,13 with 
different breadth for each zone. The limit of territorial sea is 12 nautical 
miles (M)14 from baseline,15 while contiguous zone is measured up to 24 
M seaward from baseline.16 EEZ’s breadth is defined beyond territorial 
sea up to 200 M.17 Unlike other maritime zones, the breadths of which 
are specific in dimension, the breadth of continental shelf does not only 
depend on distance criteria. The outer limits of the continental shelf 
also consider the geology and geomorphology of seabed. Accordingly, 
LOSC does not specify fixed breadth of the continental shelf, which can 
reach up to 350 M or more.18
11  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, open for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). The convention is also 
known as UNCLOS, abbreviation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.
12  Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention 
and the related Agreements as at 03 June 2011. Available at <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>
13  LOSC, Articles 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 47
14  In this paper, nautical mile is abbreviated as M. 1 M = 1,852 metres.
15  LOSC, Article 3
16  LOSC, Article 33 (2)
17  LOSC, Article 57
18  LOSC, Article 76
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B. Introducing maritime boundary delimitation
With such a geographical situation, it is hard to find a coastal State 
that can claim a full suit of maritime zones without having overlapping 
claims with its neighbours. To be able to fully claim EEZ, for example, 
distance of a coastal State from its neighbours must be more than twice 
the breadth of EEZ, which is 200 M, from the baseline. For the case of 
continental shelf, the distance required may be even more. However, 
this situation does not impact the way the breadth of maritime zones 
are theoretically measured from baselines. Considering the geographi-
cal location of coastal States in the world and the configuration of their 
coasts, overlapping claims of maritime zones among coastal States is 
inevitable (see Figure 2). Accordingly, maritime boundary delimitation 
is required. 
Figure 2 Principle of maritime boundary delimitation
(Source: After Carleton and Schofield (2001: 53))
27 Volume 12 Number 1 October 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
The process of maritime boundary delimitation between two or 
more coastal States is governed by the principles and rules of public 
international law.19 Maritime boundary delimitation is usually resolved 
either through negotiation among affected parties or by submission of 
the case to the third party.20 This third party can be arbitrators, media-
tors, courts or tribunal such as International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
Figure 2 shows that overlapping claim takes place in EEZ and con-
tinental shelf because distance between State A and B is less then 400 
M but is more than 24 M. Should the distance between those two neigh-
bouring States be less than 24 M then their territorial sea will overlap 
one another. Figure 2 also illustrates that maritime boundary delimita-
tion can be required for territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf, de-
pending on the distance between States in question. In this regard, rules 
governing maritime boundary delimitation for those different zones are 
also different.21 
III.INDONESIA-MALAYSIA MARITIME BOUNDARIES
Indonesia started maritime boundary negotiations with its neigh-
bours in the 1960s and signed the first maritime boundary agreement 
with Malaysia. Since then, various maritime boundary agreements 
were agreed with its neighbours until the latest one with Singapore 
was signed on 3 September 2014.22 As of March 2015, 19 agreements 
have been in place and three agreements, the 1997 Indonesia-Australia 
19  Prescott, V. and Schofield, C. 2005. The maritime political boundaries of the world. 
Second Edition. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [First edition 2004.]
20  Above note 17
21  Arsana, I.M.A. 2007. International Maritime Bondaries: A Technical and Legal 
Perspective [Batas Maritim Antarnegara: Sebuah tinjauan teknis dan yuridis]. 
Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press.
22  Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014, RI-Singapore signed maritime boundary 
agreement for the Eastern Part of the Singapore Strait [RI-Singapura Tanda Tangani 
Perjanjian Garis Batas Laut di Timur Selat Singapura], available at http://www.
kemlu.go.id/_layouts/mobile/PortalDetail-NewsLike.aspx?l=id&ItemId=8ffe392c-
64cd-4501-bf73-cea2b093a06d
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EEZ agreement,23 the 2014 Indonesia-the Philippines24 agreement and 
the 2014 Indonesia-Singapore agreement25 have not entered into force 
because they are yet to be ratified. Figure 3 shows Indonesia’s settled 
maritime boundaries in area relevant to this paper (around the Malacca 
Strait, Singapore Strait, and South China Sea).
Figure 3 Indonesia’s settled maritime boundaries with its neighbours in the Malacca 
Strait, Singapore Strait, and South China Sea
(Source: visualisation by the author using Google Maps and publically-available 
coordinates of maritime boundary points)
The first maritime boundary agreement was on seabed boundary 
with Malaysia in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea singed signed 
23  Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia establishing an exclusive economic zo`ne boundary and certain seabed 
boundaries. See Prescott, VJR. 2002. Australia-Indonesia, Report Number 6-2(6) in 
Charney J.I. and Smith R. W. (eds) International Maritime Boundaries, pp. 2714-
2727, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands
24  Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2014, Philippines and Indonesia 
sign agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary , Available at < http://www.
gov.ph/2014/05/23/philippines-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-on-eez-boundary/>
25  See above note 22
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on 27 October 1969.26 The second agreement is the territorial sea bound-
ary in the Malacca Strait signed on 17 March 1970 in Kuala Lumpur.27 
Indonesia and Malaysia are currently undertaking maritime boundary 
negotiation for four different locations: the Malacca Strait (EEZ), the 
Singapore Strait (territorial Sea), South China Sea (EEZ) and Sulawesi 
Sea (territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf).28
Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to delimit EEZ boundaries in the 
northern part of the Malacca Strait, where distance between the two 
States is more than 24 M.29 The issue that seem to be faced by Indonesia 
and Malaysia in the delimitation is that Indonesia likely to favour that 
the EZZ boundary line should not coincide with the existing seabed 
boundary. It is likely that Indonesia will propose the use of equidistance 
line in the delimitation to establish an equitable EEZ boundary for the 
two neighbours. Accordingly, the EEZ line will lie at the Malaysian 
side of the seabed boundary line. In constructing the equidistance line 
for EEZ boundary, Indonesia apparently gives full effect to its relevant 
archipelagic baselines in the Malacca Strait. This view is clearly ex-
pressed in the latest Map of the Republic of Indonesia (Peta NKRI) 
issued in 2013 depicting Indonesia’s forward position concerning mari-
time boundaries. It is clear that the proposed EEZ line lies at the Malay-
sian side of the 1969 seabed boundary.30
In accordance to Peta NKRI 2013, Indonesia has also defined a 
Fisheries Management Area through the Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries (MMAF)’s Regulation number 1 of 2009, which is also 
known as Wilayah Pengelolaan Perikanan (WPP).31  The outer limits of 
26 For a complete documentation of the agreement, see: Park, Choon-ho. 1993. 
Indonesia- Malaysia (Continental Shelf) in Charney J.I. and Alexander L.M. (eds) 
International Maritime Boundaries, pp. 1025-1027, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, the 
Netherlands
27  Above note 1, p. 55
28  See above note 9
29  See also R. Haller-Trost, The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of 
Malaysia: An International Law Perspective (London: Kluwer Law International 
Ltd, 1998), pp. 23–32.
30  Badan Informasi Geospasial. 2013. Map of the Republic of Indonesia [Peta Negara 
Kesatuan Republik of Indonesia]
31  MMAF 2009. Ministry of Marine affairs and Fisheries’ Regulation number 1 of 
2009. At http://www.infohukum.kk go.id/files_permen/PER%2001%20MEN%20
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the WPP, as shown on the accompanying map, coincide with Indone-
sia’s territorial sea or EEZ limits, either agreed, unilaterally-defined or 
unilaterally-claimed.  Maritime areas in the Malacca Strait are included 
in a Fisheries Management Area of WPP-571 enclosed by Indonesia’s 
proposed EEZ boundary line in the Malacca Strait. Fishing activities 
conducted by Indonesian fishermen are based on the WPP map.
On the other hand, Malaysia seems to prefer a single boundary line 
for seabed and EEZ, as depicted in its 1979 Map (also known as Peta 
Baru 1979).32 Meanwhile the EEZ boundary as proposed by Indonesia 
lies somewhere in the north of the 1969 seabed boundary. Accordingly, 
there is maritime space where these two States have overlapping claim 
over EEZ, which complicate the management of resources in the area, 
including fish. In addition, it seems that Malaysia has been operating in 
the Malacca Strait as if the EEZ boundary has been established, coin-
cident with seabed boundary. For instance, Malaysian fishermen have 
been fishing in the water beyond its territorial sea claimed (depicted in 
the 1979 Map) up the 1969 seabed boundary line. Accordingly, Malay-
sia’s fishermen were often captured by Indonesia’s maritime enforce-
ment agency in this disputed area. The Malaysian fishermen, especially 
those of Hutan Melintang, located on the western coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia, came to the area closed to Indonesia because of the depleting 
fish resources in Malaysian waters, while the resources in the Indonesian 
side of the Malacca Strait is relatively underexploited.33 Adding further 
problems to the complexity, the fishermen often utilised environmen-
tally-unfriendly equipment such as bottom trawl to exploit resources in 
the area.34 However, the use of bottom trawls is largely unselective in 
terms of fish catches and destructive for the seabed. Consequently, this 
type of fishing leads to ecologically unsustainable fishing practices in 
the Malacca Strait. On the other hands, Indonesian fishermen, who fish 
2009.pdf (Accessed on 22 March 2011).
32  Director of National Mapping, Rampaian 97, Cetakan 1-PPNM; Notification of 
a New Map of the Continental Shelf of Malaysia, Jil. 23, No. 26, Tambahan No.1, 
No.5745, 21 December 1979.
33  Num, M.J. 2009. Pirates, Barter Traders, and Fishers: Whose Rights, Whose 
Security? User Conflicts and Maritime Nontraditional Security in Malaysian Waters 
in Laipson, E. and Pandya, A. The Indian Ocean - Resource and Governance 
Challenges, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, p. 21
34  Above note 30
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in accordance to WPP Map the same area, are also often captured by 
Malaysian patrolling officers.
The aforementioned incidences are, among other things, the reasons 
why certainty of maritime boundaries, especially EEZ, in the Malacca 
Strait is vital. Indonesia and Malaysia need to negotiate more inten-
sively to achieve a final and binding “equitable solution”35 for them. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these two States have different views re-
garding EEZ boundaries in the Malacca Strait, it is a fact that EEZ 
boundary has yet to be bilaterally delimited. Soon after an agreement 
is achieved, Indonesia and Malaysia can conduct more effective utili-
sation and management of marine resources within area assigned to 
each of them. As stated in the LOSC, a State’s EEZ would endow the 
State with “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed 
and its subsoil”.36
IV.THE 7 APRIL 2011 INCIDENTS
An incident took place on 7 April 2011 involving Malaysian-flagged 
vessels, Indonesian patrolling officials form Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries and Malaysian helicopters.37 Indonesian patrolling team 
identified two vessels fishing allegedly illegally in Indonesia’s exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ). When the two vessels were seized, three 
Malaysian helicopters appeared on-site demanding that the two ves-
sels be released. Convinced with what they were doing, the Indonesian 
officials went on and disregarded the demand. The two vessels were 
brought to Belawan Port in Indonesia and fishermen operating the ves-
sels were detained.38
Even though this may be seen as a successful effort by the Indo-
nesian officials in preventing foreign fishermen from fishing illegally 
35  As required by Article 74 of the LOSC governing the EEZ boundary delimitation.
36  LOSC, Art. 55 (1) (a)
37  MMAF. 2011. Press Release: Again, illegal fishing vessels seized [Kembali, kapal il-
legal fishing ditangkap]. Available at <http://www.kkp.go.id/index.php/mobile/arsip/c/4336/
KEMBALI-KAPAL-ILLEGAL-FISHING-DITANGKAP/>
38  Ibid
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in Indonesian waters, Malaysia’s response by sending three helicop-
ters did spark protest and anger in Indonesia. As anticipated, the issue 
was highly debated in Indonesia and was prominently featured in na-
tional news headlines. It is interesting to observe that news in Indone-
sian media generally analysed non technical-legal aspects of the issues 
and focused on the conflict-prone relationship between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. This case was easily related to other issues by some parties, 
which in fact has nothing to do with maritime dispute, such as unlawful 
treatment given by several Malaysians to their Indonesian maids.39
By observing coordinates of the fishing vessels in question,40 it is 
clear that the incident took place in an overlapping area of EEZ be-
tween Indonesia and Malaysia (see section 3) as illustrated in Figure 4. 
As previously highlighted, unilateral claims by Indonesia and Malaysia 
generate an overlapping area of EEZ in the Malacca Strait. In fact, there 
has been no EEZ boundary in the northern part of the Malacca Strait 
between the two States. Hence, it is legally impossible to judge whether 
or not fishermen activities in the northern part of the Malacca Strait are 
infringement to international maritime boundaries. Having observed 
this, infringement committed by the Malaysian-flagged vessels was in 
fact viewed from Indonesia’s perspective with its unilaterally-claimed 
EEZ boundary line. Likewise, the presence of Indonesian patrolling of-
ficials is also viewed as a border crossing by Malaysia.
39  This can be found in various offline and online discussion forums, mailing list, blog 
postings and also newspapers.
40  Coordinates were obtained from a press release by MMAF. See above note 33
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Figure 4 Incident in the Malacca Strait on 7 April 2011 
(Source: visualisation by the author using Google Maps and publically-available 
coordinates of maritime boundary points and location of incidents)
Indonesian officials captured the two Malaysian-flagged vessels as 
shown in Figure 4 because they considered the EEZ boundaries in the 
Malacca Strait is the one claimed by Indonesia. On the other hand, the 
Malaysian helicopter team viewed that the fishing vessels were operat-
ing within their EEZ because they based their operation on Malaysia’s 
1979 map showing Malaysia’s unilateral claim. In line with this view, 
the helicopter team was likely to be of the view that the Indonesian 
patrolling vessel entered Malaysian EEZ. Put simply, both patrolling 
teams were operating based on their own maps which showed their re-
spective unilateral claims in the absence of a bilaterally agreed mari-
time boundary line.
V. MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE MALACCA STRAIT
As previously highlighted, the main purpose of this paper is to pro-
vide options of maritime delimitation in the Malacca Strait between 
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Indonesia and Malaysia. Analysis provided here is purely scientific 
without any political intervention/agenda. The delimitation options, 
therefore, do not represent the view of any government or institution.
A. Legal Basis
When the seabed boundary in Malacca Strait was signed by Indonesia 
and Malaysia in 1969, the concept of EEZ had not yet been recognised in 
international law of the sea. EEZ concept was adopted formally for the 
first time under LOSC in 1982.41 Accordingly, at the time when the 1969 
seabed agreement was signed, Indonesia and Malaysia did not sign any 
other agreement concerning water column delimitation in the Malacca 
Strait beyond territorial sea of each State. By the official recognition of 
EEZ concept in the LOSC, a delimitation of EEZ in the Malacca Strait 
was possible. Considering that the longest distance between the coast line 
of Malaysia and Indonesia in Malacca Strait is less than two times 200 
M,42 delimitation is required for the whole area of Malacca Strait, from 
the northern part up the southern part. In the southern part where distance 
between the two States is less than 24 M,43 delimitation of territorial sea 
EEZ delimitation is governed by Article 74 of the LOSC consisting of 
four paragraphs. EEZ delimitation is aimed at achieving “an equitable 
solution” based on “international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.”44 If States in question fail to 
make an agreement “within a reasonable period of time,” they shall con-
duct a settlement of dispute as provided for in Part XV.45 Article 74 also 
governs that States in question shall attempt to establish a “provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature”, which “shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation.”46 It is worth noting that if there is an existing 
agreement between States in question, the new EEZ agreement “shall be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.”47
41  For more information regarding the development of LOSC, see: The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective). Available from 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_per-
spective.htm>
42  Measurement is on British Admiralty Chart. and Google Maps
43  Measurement is on British Admiralty Chart. and Google Maps
44  LOSC, Article 74 (1)
45  LOSC, Article 74 (2)
46  LOSC, Article 74 (3)
47  LOSC, Article 74 (4)
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One important thing in Article 74 of LOSC is that it does not specify 
any method to achieve the so-called “equitable solution”. It can be in-
ferred from this provision that the method can be ‘anything’ as long as 
it is accepted by States in question. However, there are methods that 
States in question can employ to facilitate the achievement of the so-
lution such as equidistance line or median line. It is worth noting that 
the principle of equidistance can produce an equal division of mari-
time space. While equal maritime space is not necessarily equitable, it 
certainly can serve as an equitable solution.48 In addition, equidistance 
or median line has relatively high degree of certainty since it is gener-
ated based on the application of strict geometric principles, provided 
that parties in question agree on baselines involved in the delimitation.49 
Another provision to consider from Article 74 is that Indonesia and Ma-
laysia shall attempt to establish a provisional agreement in the Malacca 
Strait if they cannot achieve a solution within a reasonable period of 
time. However, it is not clear how Indonesia and Malaysia should de-
fine the phrase “reasonable period of time”. This is certainly subjective 
and it is up to the States in question to define. It seems that both States 
have not seen that they have passed a “reasonable period of time” with-
out agreed EEZ in the Malacca Strait, thus they have not established 
any provisional agreement.
With regard to the provision that EEZ should not be in violation to 
existing agreement, it does not seem that this is applicable to Indonesia 
and Malaysia. The 1969 agreement is on seabed boundary and it has 
nothing to do with EEZ agreement. Therefore, the 1969 agreement shall 
not be used in any way to dictate the future agreement on EEZ. Having 
had a seabed agreement in place, it is worth nothing that the future EEZ 
agreement will solely deal with water column even though theoretically 
EEZ, according to the LOSC, also encompasses seabed.50 Accordingly, 
the existing agreement will eventually affect the future EEZ agreement 
in a sense that the agreed EEZ boundary will not govern seabed area 
and resources therein.
48  Above note 17, p. 236
49  Beazly, P. B. 1994. Technical Aspects of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, Maritime 
Briefing, Vol. 1/2, International Boundary Research Unit: Durham
50  LOSC, Article 55 (1) (a)
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B. Existing Agreement and Baselines Issues 
The 1969 seabed boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia in the 
Malacca Strait lies considerably closer to Indonesia that to Malaysia. 
Geospatial analysis of the boundary shows that there is a possibility that 
Malaysia employed straight baseline in the construction of the bound-
ary. However, there is no official publication of Malaysia’s straight 
baselines and scholars usually only infer the use of such straight base-
lines.51 One of the relevant publications is the 1979 map,52 which does 
not depict baselines but does show the outer limits of Malaysia’s ter-
ritorial sea.53 Location of baselines can be inferred by pulling lines at 
a distance of 12 M from the outer limits of territorial sea landward. 
It shows that Malaysia is suspected to employ straight baselines con-
necting, among others, Pulau Perak and Pulau Jarak, two small islands 
located in the Malacca Strait at around 80 and 36 M from the Malaysian 
peninsula, respectively.54 
A considerably comprehensive analysis reveals that the baselines 
of Malaysia in the Malacca Strait are invalid for several reasons.55 It 
stated that the designations of such baselines and territorial sea claims 
as depicted in the 1979 are invalid because they have “breached both 
the 1958 Geneva Convention and the Vienna Law of Treaties Conven-
tion.” The basepoints and baselines used “do not conform to 1982 UN-
CLOS Article 7.” In addition, the designations and claims “restricted 
the rights of third-party states”. Malaysia, according to the analysis, 
also published public documents and undertook actions inconsistent 
with its claims.56 In the delimitation of pending maritime boundaries in 
the Malacca Strait, this issue of baseline is one of the important aspects 
to consider.
51  Forbes, V.L., Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries, op. cit., p. 22. See also: Valencia, 
M. J., 2003, Validity of Malaysia’s baselines and territorial sea claim in the northern 
Malacca Strait, Marine Policy Vol. 27 pp. 367-373
52  Above note 29
53  Valencia, M. J., 2003, Validity of Malaysia’s baselines and territorial sea claim in 
the northern Malacca Strait, op cit p. 369
54  Measurement on relevant British Admiralty Chart and Google Maps
55  Above note 48
56  Above note 30, p. 367.
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C. EEZ Delimitation
As for the method of delimitation, it does not seem that equidistance 
is unacceptable in establishing EEZ boundary in the Malacca Strait. 
Considering that Malaysia has not made any official publication/dec-
laration concerning its straight baselines, it will be, to an extent, ac-
ceptable that Malaysia is considered to employ normal baselines.57 In 
other words, should a coastal States not make any other claims, the 
coastal State will have normal baselines, which are coincident with the 
low-water line along its coast.58 Accordingly, one of the options in EEZ 
delimitation in the Malacca Strait is by considering Malaysia’s nor-
mal, instead of straight, baselines. On the other hands, Indonesia, as an 
internationally-recognised archipelagic State, is entitled to employ its 
archipelagic baselines. This use of baselines in constructing maritime 
boundary line will consequently make the EEZ boundary lies on the 
Malaysian side of the 1969 seabed. This view seems to be taken by In-
donesia as expressed in its official map issued in 2013,59 where the EEZ 
boundary claimed by Indonesia is drawn on the Malaysian side of the 
1969 seabed line.
It is worth noting, however, that even though Malaysia has yet to 
declare its straight baselines, there is always possibility for Malaysia to 
do so and relevant provision in the LOSC allows that. An analysis of 
potential baselines suggests that it is possible for Malaysia to employ 
straight baselines in the Malacca Strait and off the northeast and south-
east coast of Sabah.60 This indicate that Malaysia might come up with 
a different proposal with regards to EEZ delimitation in the Malacca 
Strait compared to what Indonesia proposes or prefers.
With regard to the role of small islands in maritime delimitation, 
Malaysia has an island called Pulau Jarak located in an ‘inconvenient’ 
position of the potential median line between Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Being a relatively small island, Pulau Jarak should not give a dispropor-
57  Beckman, R., and Schofield, C. 2009. “Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island 
Sovereignty: ICJ Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the 
Singapore Strait”, Ocean Development & International Law,40:1,1 — 35
58  See the definition of normal baselines in Article 5 of the LOSC.
59  Above note 27
60  Forbes, V. L., 2007, “The Territorial Sea Datum of Malaysia.” MIMA Bulletin 14: 
3-8.
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tionate effect to maritime delimitation and this is recognised in inter-
national case law.61 The International Court of Justice has also decided 
cases involving small islands/rocks such as the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case,62 Tunisia/Libya,63 Libya/Malta,64 and Qatar v. Bahrain.65 The 
decisions indicate that the equitableness of the maritime boundary re-
sulting from the application of the equidistance line principle depends 
on whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the “disproportionate 
effect” caused by small features such as islets, rocks, and coastal pro-
jections along the coast.66 As an option in EEZ delimitation, Pulau Jarak 
can be ignored (given nil effect) in the creation of robust median line.67 
In the next step, the existence of Pulau Jarak can modify the robust 
median line in such a way that it generates part of a circle of territorial 
sea measured from Pulau Jarak (see Figure 5). This is similar to EEZ 
delimitation between Indonesia and Australia in the Timor Sea in 1997. 
The existence of Pulau Pasir/Ashmore Reef modifies equidistance line 
based on which the 1997 EEZ boundary was established. Ashmore reef 
61  See also: Lowe, V., Carleton, C., and Ward, C. (2002) In The Matter of East Timor’s 
Maritime Boundaries Opinion. Accessed from http://www.petrotimor.com/lglop.html 
on 10 July 2010.
62  International Court of Justice. 1969. “North Sea continental shelf cases (Federal 
Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 
Judgement of 20 February 1969, The Hague, The Netherlands”; accessed from <http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf> on 21 September 2011.
63  International Court of Justice. 1982. “Case concerning the continental shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgement of 24 February 1982, The Hague, The 
Netherlands”, accessed from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/ 6267.pdf> on 22 
September 2011.
64  International Court of Justice. 1985. “Case concerning continental shelf (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgement of 3 June 1985, The Hague, The Netherlands”, 
accessed from < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/ 9573.pdf> on 20 September 
2011.
65  International Court of Justice. 2001. “Case concerning maritime delimitation and 
territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgement of 16 March 
2001, The Hague, The Netherlands”, accessed from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/87/7027.pdf> on 24 September 2011.
66  Shi, J. 2010. “Maritime delimitation in the jurisprudence of the International Court 
of Justice, Chinese Journal of International Law Vol. 9 No. 2 (June): 271-291.
67  Pulau Jarak is located at 03° 58’ 40’’ N, 100° 06’ 06” E with a size of only 0.08 
square kilometers an uninhibited. See: Malaysia Beneath the Waves, accessed from 
<http://www.mir.com.my/potpourri/places/mpwong/destination/pulau_jarak.htm> on 
14 October 2011
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causes the form of maritime pouch in such a way that the pouch is lo-
cated on the Indonesian side of median line.68
Unilateral claims of EEZ boundary by Indonesia and Malaysia can 
also be viewed as forward position of each party. This can be considered 
as a starting position held by each State to begin with in conducting ne-
gotiation on EEZ delimitation. As a nature of negotiation, each party will 
attempt to convince other party to agree upon its proposal. Indonesia, 
undoubtedly, will do whatever it takes to persuade Malaysia to accept 
its proposal and the same approach will be carried out by Malaysia. In 
a negotiation, it is worth recalling that it is rare indeed that a negotia-
tion results in one participant gaining everything and the other nothing.69 
In other words, there is possibility that the final agreement achieved by 
Indonesia and Malaysia will follow neither Indonesia’s nor Malaysia’s 
claim. Possibility to generate a compromised line based on both their 
forward positions may become an option accepted by both parties. 
In a negotiation anything can happen and anything can be proposed. 
The question is how one party can convince the other. Indonesia for its 
part will undoubtedly attempt as hard as possible to convince Malaysia 
to accept its proposal. From one perspective, Indonesia’s position may 
be viewed acceptable since it is based on equidistance principle. Even 
though equidistance line is not necessarily equitable, equidistance line 
can certainly serve as an equitable solution provided that there is no 
special circumstances to consider.70 Meanwhile, Malaysia may defend 
its position for, among other things, a practicality reason. It is true that 
management will be significantly easier if Indonesia and Malaysia agree 
upon an EEZ boundary that coincides with existing seabed boundary. 
However, practicality shall not ignore a more important consideration, 
which is legal aspect that requires a solution to be equitable.71
By considering LOSC, jurisprudences based on ICJ’s decision on 
similar cases, and state practices, Figure 5 illustrates possibilities of 
EEZ boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Malacca Strait. 
68  See for example: Prescott, V. 1997. “The completion of marine boundary delimita-
tion between Australia and Indonesia”, Geopolitics Vol. 2 No. 2 (Autumn): 132–149
69  Schofield, C. and Arsana, I M. A. 2005. “Ambalat revised: The way forward?”, The 
Jakarta Post, 9 June 2005, Jakarta, Indonesia
70  Above note 17
71  LOSC, Article 74
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The figure illustrates first option preferred by Indonesia (Indonesia’s 
forward position) and second option in favour to Malaysia (Malaysia’s 
forward position). Malaysia’s current forward position, as illustrated in 
Figure 5 coincides with the existing 1969 seabed boundary. Only by ob-
serving with naked eyes, its distance is significantly closer to Indonesia 
than that to Malaysia. It may naturally beg a question of equitability. 
Should Indonesia and Malaysia fail to agree upon one of their pro-
posals, it is likely that the two States agree upon a third option. The 
third option may be resulted from compromising the two proposals. 
For the third option, possibilities are endless when it comes to precise 
location of the boundary line. In this case, the proportion of line and its 
distance from the two forward positions will depend highly on negotia-
tion process between the two States. Generating a strict equidistance 
line equally dividing the overlapping area enclosed by the two forward 
positions is an option Indonesia and Malaysia may consider. 
Figure 5. EEZ boundary options in the Strait of Malacca
(Source: analysis by the author using Peta NKRI and publically-available 
coordinates of boundary points by utilising CARIS LOTS software)
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VI. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
A. Challenges
The main challenge in delimiting EEZ in the Malacca Strait be-
tween Indonesia and Malaysia is in balancing the legality and equi-
tability proposed by Indonesia and practicality reason of Malaysia. 
Undoubtedly each party will attempt to stick to its own position and 
therefore negotiations may take a long time to finish. Another challenge 
is the fact that law enforcement has been carried out in the area based 
on unilateral claim. This has become something that people in the field 
take for granted. For patrolling officials from Indonesia and Malaysia, 
the unilateral claim has become ‘law’ that they have to obey since that 
is what they are ordered to follow. It is a challenge to change this mind-
set for the sake of achieving a bigger goal.
For Indonesia, another critical challenge is also to provide sufficient 
information to the public regarding maritime boundary delimitation so 
that people have better understanding concerning the process. It is evi-
dent that people are relatively easily instigated by border issues since 
it is strongly related to nationalism. Disproportional response from the 
people often causes chaotic situation that can indirectly hamper the 
progress of negotiations by the two States. The challenge for the In-
donesian government is to achieve a balance between the provision of 
sufficient information to the public and the maintenance of a sufficient 
level of confidentiality in the process of delimitation. Undoubtedly, not 
every single issue regarding maritime delimitation negotiation can be 
made available to public.
The next challenges are those related to management when delimi-
tation has been finalised. Having observed possible options highlighted 
earlier, it is likely that EEZ boundaries is not coincident with seabed 
boundary. The arrangement, should it be agreed by Indonesia and Ma-
laysia, will create a maritime space in which the seabed fall within Ma-
laysia’s sovereign rights, while waters are under the control of Indone-
sia. This will certainly affect the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources in the Malacca Strait. This potential complication is similar 
to that in the Timor Sea due to different EEZ and seabed boundary 
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lines between Indonesia and Australia.72 One of the common sources of 
problems is the lack of understanding among fishers on what constitute 
sedentary species that belongs to continental shelf and therefore are 
not subject to be taken in fishing activities.73 In the area where EEZ 
are under Indonesia’s control while seabed is under Malaysia’s, seden-
tary species should not be taken by Indonesian fishers. However, due to 
lack of understanding and also the unselective use of fishing equipment, 
sedentary species such as sea cucumbers may be taken accidentally. In 
the case of Indonesia-Australia EEZ boundaries in the Timor Sea, it is 
identified that problems arise due to, among other things, the fact that 
there are different line for seabed and water column boundaries.74
To minimise conflict due to lack of understanding, there must be 
clarity in the future agreement concerning the definition of sedentary 
species agreed by both parties, by particularly listing specific species 
included in the agreement. The list should include, but not be limited 
to, specific and common species in the area that are likely to be the 
subject of fishing activities. In other words, the agreement should spec-
ify detailed information on sedentary species in addition to the general 
definition given by the LOSC. Secondly, information dissemination is 
essential for Indonesian and Malaysian fishers about the boundaries 
themselves and the agreement concerning sedentary species. Not only 
that, this dissemination is also important for law enforcement agencies 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. It is worth noting that in Indonesia alone, 
there are several institutions responsible for patrolling maritime bound-
ary areas such as Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Indo-
nesian Navy, and Police force. Effective information dissemination re-
garding maritime boundary and related agreements can ideally enhance 
coordination and cooperation among those institutions.
72  Herriman, M. and M. Tsamenyi. 1998., “The 1997 Australia-Indonesia maritime 
boundary treaty A Secure Legal regime for offshore resource development?”, Journal 
of Ocean Development and International Law 29:  361-396.
73  Article of LOSC states that sedentary species are “organisms which, at the harvest-
able stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in 
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.”
74  Fox, J. J. 2009. Legal and Illegal Indonesian Fishing In Australian Waters ”, in: 
Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds), Indonesia beyond the water’s edge; Managing 
an archipelagic state, pp. 218-219. Singapore: ISEAS.
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B. Opportunities
The occurrence of incidents like the one on 7 April 2011 attracted 
attention of media, people and government. While this may be seen as 
a cause of chaotic situation in Indonesia or Malaysia, the incident can 
be viewed as a ‘blessing in disguise’ in terms of focussing on maritime 
boundary issues. This should be seen as an opportunity to accelerate 
maritime delimitation in the area. Now negotiating teams in Indonesia 
and Malaysia can find more convincing reasons why EEZ delimitation 
should be prioritised. Fixed maritime boundary is essential to prevent 
or at least to minimise incidents and to promote responsible utilisation 
of maritime resources in the Malacca Strait.
Indonesia and Malaysia are two neighbours with a lot of similari-
ties. Culture, language, and the major religion that they share are op-
portunities for them to accelerate delimitation process. Those similari-
ties can ideally be beneficial to build confidence and trust between the 
two States that will eventually facilitate more effective and efficient 
communication between them. Good communication should be able to 
minimise misunderstanding so that the two States can focus on issues 
that matter the most to achieve final solution.
Indonesia’s extensive experiences in settling maritime boundaries 
with eight neighbours (India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia) are also a positive 
factor for maritime delimitation in the Strait of Malacca. With such ex-
perience Indonesia may be able to adopt best practices of maritime de-
limitation it has been through and implement them in maritime delimi-
tation negotiation with Malaysia. Indonesia should be confident enough 
to initiate and lead the process while maintaining respect to Malaysia’s 
role. Relevant parties from both States should work hand in hand and 
do everything in their power to achieve an equitable solution of EEZ 
boundary in the Malacca Strait.
Now with Indonesia focusing more on maritime issues as proposed 
by President Joko Widodo’s administration, maritime boundary delim-
itation has a significantly stronger support. In order for Indonesia to 
be a “maritime axis of the world” it should ensure its sovereignty and 
sovereign rights over maritime area. Therefore, maritime boundary de-
limitation with its neighbours has never been more urgent. This politi-
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cal support will eventually hoped to accelerate the process of maritime 
boundary delimitation between Indonesia and its neighbours, including 
Malaysia.
VII.CONCLUSION
Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to settle an agreed EEZ boundary 
in the Malacca Strait. For Indonesia, it is one of the approximately 15 
pending maritime boundary segments to settle, scattered in around 10 
different locations. Even though no maritime boundary has been agreed 
in the Malacca Strait, Indonesia and Malaysia have declared their uni-
lateral claims which to an extent overlap one another, generating an area 
of EEZ claimed by both States. Interestingly, Indonesia and Malaysia 
conduct law enforcement in the Malacca Strait based on their unilateral 
claim. Accordingly, Malaysian fishermen’s presence in the overlapping 
EEZ will be viewed by Indonesia as an infringement and vice versa. An 
example of this is the 7 April 2011 incident involving Indonesian offi-
cials, Malaysian-flagged vessels and Malaysian helicopters. After about 
four years of the incident, EEZ boundary remains pending. 
Finalising maritime delimitation is one of the ideal solutions in or-
der for Indonesia and Malaysia to avoid or at least minimise maritime 
conflict in the Malacca Strait. This is an important agenda, along with 
delimitation of other pending maritime boundaries in Singapore Strait, 
South China Sea and Sulawesi Sea. At the time of writing this paper 
(March 2015), the two States are currently in the process of negotia-
tions which take place in Malaysia or Indonesia. Around 27 negotia-
tions have been conducted, even though not all of them were primarily 
for maritime delimitation in the Malacca Strait.75
Three main options of EEZ boundaries that Indonesia and Malaysia 
can consider are Indonesia’s proposal, Malaysia’s proposal and another 
option as a compromise between the two proposals. Indonesia’s propos-
al is based on equidistance principle, while Malaysia prefers the EEZ 
line to coincide with the existing seabed boundary signed in 1969. Even 
though both parties will undoubtedly attempt to persuade other party to 
agree upon its own proposal, it is not surprising if both eventually agree 
75  See above note 9
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on a third option which is a compromised line between both proposals. 
The final line agreed by Indonesia and Malaysia will undoubtedly de-
pends on the negotiation process and how both parties take into account 
relevant factors such as the use of baselines and consideration given 
to relevant small islands around the region. Regardless of the result of 
negotiations in the future, it is likely that both States prefer negotiations 
to achieve resolution as opposed to other channels such as mediation, 
arbitration and litigation. However, bringing the case to a third party is 
certainly not impossible if the negotiation fails to achieve mutual agree-
ments between Indonesia and Malaysia. Previous experiences in deal-
ing with ICJ in the case of sovereignty dispute over Pulau Sipadan and 
Ligitan76 (Indonesia-Malaysia) and the case of Pedra Branca, Middle 
Rock and South Ledge (Malaysia-Singapore)77 should to an extent in-
fluence decision whether or not to bring the case to a third party. At the 
time of writing, all remain to be se
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